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1. Introduction 
Despite the crucial role played by crises in poor rural people’s lives, the literature on income 
mobility has largely ignored the potential cumulative effect of disasters. The scarcity of 
detailed household studies on such spillover effects represents a particularly serious lack of 
knowledge of processes of economic mobility (Baulch and Hoddinott 2000). This paper 
contributes to this knowledge by drawing on several “natural experiments” to evaluate the 
impact of natural disasters on income mobility of rural households in Pakistan. 
The gap in the literature is unfortunate because government interventions to mediate 
the impact of a disaster necessitate knowledge of its nature. Firstly, if there are effects from 
these short-time shocks also in the aftermath of the crises, then the duration of crisis relief 
programmes might have to be reconsidered. Secondly, if the disaster causes long-term 
reduction in income, for example due to distress depletion of capital, then government 
protection against such short-term adverse adaptation to the crisis may yield immense long-
term benefits.  
A main reason for the lack of attention to how crises impact on economic mobility is 
that this requires detailed panel surveys with data collected both before and after a crisis. 
Also, to distinguish between the impact of the disaster and other events, one would prefer data 
on a comparison group that was not affected by the crisis. These requirements pose a 
considerable obstacle to such impact studies, especially in areas that are likely to be most  
vulnerable to disasters since there are few panel surveys in poor countries (Fields 2001).1 
                                                 
1 Poor people in the rural areas of developing countries are frequently subjected to large income shocks, and the 
consequences might be starvation, or worse (Lipton and Ravallion 1995). Since a large fraction of this 
population is dependent on agriculture as their main source of income, several studies suggest that the severe 
impact of natural disasters such as floods, droughts or storms is deepened by missing insurance markets for these 
types of covariant shocks (Besley 1995). However, the poor are often able to mitigate risk through risk 
management strategies like diversification of crops, fields and employment decisions. They also engage in risk 
coping through saving and informal risk-sharing arrangements and adjusting labor supply (Morduch 1995). 
However, for large covariant shocks such as natural disasters, neither of these strategies may be sufficient for 
avoiding starvation, and it is found that local informal insurance networks are put under considerable strain 
because all members will draw on the arrangement when the shock is covariant (Morduch 1999). Foster (1995) 
in Bangladesh makes this point, where he finds that the body size of children suffers after a flood due to the 
parents’ inability to borrow or get insurance. For a survey of the literature on risk and consumption in developing 
countries, see Alderman and Paxon (1992). 
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Our data from rural Pakistan are particularly well suited to analyzing the effects of 
large covariant shocks. The panel covers almost 800 households that were surveyed in 14 
rounds over a period of five years, and during the panel period three different natural disasters 
occurred in three different districts at three different points in time. To the extent that these 
disasters hit the rural population randomly, the data provides us with “natural experiments”. 
Hence, by comparing the income mobility of the households that were subjected to crises with 
the mobility of the others, we may be able to evaluate the impact of the disaster on income 
mobility. However, both measurement error and statistical inference are issues that are 
important for what conclusions we can draw from this type of studies. We address both issues 
here before we turn to the conclusions. 
The first issue is that transition matrices, a powerful tool often used to evaluate 
economic mobility and an instrument employed in this study, is only descriptive if not 
accompanied by the variance of the estimates of the transition probabilities. Hence, it is 
impossible to evaluate whether differences between transition probabilities are statistical 
significant or not. However, this issue is seldom addressed in the literature. In general, most 
poverty statistics are usually computed from one sample of the population, which implies that 
having a large number of samples would provide us with the standard error of point estimates 
of poverty measures. However, it is a well-known problem that the analytic estimate of 
standard errors of estimators can be very difficult or impossible to calculate. This complexity 
seems to be the main reason why several mobility studies do not carry out statistical inference 
when making use of transition matrices (see for example Bane and Ellwood 1986, Hentschel 
and Lanjouw 1996, Dercon and Krishnan 2000, Scott 2000, Birchenall 2001, Parker and 
Gardner 2002). 
The difficulties in calculating the standard errors have spurred the application of the 
bootstrap in recent econometric studies because it provides a tractable method of estimating 
the sampling distribution of a statistic (see Mills and Zandvakili 1997, Osberg and Xu, 2000). 
By generating random samples with replacement from the original sample, it is possible to 
simulate the original sampling procedure and hence statistical inference can be based on the 
bootstrapped distribution of the estimator. A comprehensive treatment of the validity of the 
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bootstrap for a variety of different aggregated inequality, poverty and mobility indices is 
provided in Biewen (2002).  
Much information is lost in aggregated indices, so transition matrices may be preferred 
for studying a range of empirical issues. Our objective is to provide a straightforward 
application of the bootstrap to construct confidence intervals for transition probabilities based 
on absolute income. Due to the complexity of the analytical derivation of the standard errors 
of the transition probabilities, this method facilitates statistical inference based on absolute 
mobility matrices.  
The second issue important for our ability to conclude from studying transition 
probabilities is that they may depend on the accuracy of the measurement of income. Since 
there are many sources of errors in micro household data on income, one should always be 
concerned with the quality of data when studying economic mobility. One important 
contribution towards assessing the impact of poor data quality is Cowell and Victoria-Feser 
(2002), who investigate how data contamination influences welfare rankings.2 On the other 
main problem of data quality, that variables are measured with error, it is widely recognized 
that this may cause bias in several poverty and mobility measures. This is particularly the case 
for income data from developing country household surveys where agriculture accounts for a 
large share of income. Despite its importance, little has been done to investigate how this 
error influences absolute mobility matrices. This is unfortunate because transition matrices are 
a powerful tool for making rigorous statistical inferences (Schluter 1997). An objective of this 
paper, therefore, is to simulate the standard model of measurement error to evaluate the 
potential influence on absolute transition matrices. 
Our results indicate that evaluating the crisis by the immediate effects on income 
mobility substantially underestimates the impact of natural disasters such as droughts, 
hailstorms and flooding compared to including the effect in the subsequent year. We find that 
the spillover effect is large for the poor. Investigating the recovery phase, i.e. the households 
moving out of a crisis and into a normal year, we find that the probability of remaining poor 
                                                 
2 Data contamination occurs if a proportion of false observations is added to the true data set, for example by 
miscoding or other types of mistakes. 
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increases by approximately 15% compared to households that were not hit by these disasters. 
During the “crisis phase”, i.e. for those that move from a normal year and into a crisis, we 
find that the probability of remaining poor increases by 40% compared to normal income 
mobility. Taken together, these results indicate that poor households experiencing a crisis also 
have their incomes substantially depressed in the subsequent year. Households in the upper 
income classes seem not to be much affected by the presence of disasters. We find only a 
small negative lagged impact of the disaster on the income mobility of these households. 
Our simulations of measurement error show that this usually increases the income 
mobility in the transition matrices in our data, as expected.3 More surprisingly, this turns out 
not to be a general rule since the error seems to reduce mobility for some middle income 
groups. This implies that policy recommendations based on these types of analysis warrants a 
thorough investigation of the nature and impact of measurement error. However, for 
comparison of the poorest (and the richest) groups across states, as in our investigation, 
measurement error seems to have little impact. Moreover, our simulations find that the error 
induces a downward bias in the probability estimates of remaining poor (rich) that is of 
similar size between the group that was hit by a crisis and the group that was not. Hence, the 
estimated difference in the probability of remaining poor (rich) across states seems to be a 
close approximation to the true difference for plausible values of measurement error. 
Irrespective of the size of the errors, however, we find that the estimated differences in the 
probabilities represent a lower bound of the true difference. Our simulations also support the 
finding that the probability of remaining poor is underestimated by measurement error (see for 
example McGarry 1995). 
 We describe the data in more detail in the next section, and then in section 3 we 
explain the methodology that lies behind our results. Our analysis of how shocks influence 
income mobility is contained in section 4, and some final comments and tentative conclusions 
are drawn in section 5. 
                                                 
3 A mean zero independently distributed error would cause attenuation bias in a regression of income on past 
income. Since a low coefficient implies high mobility, because past income then explains little of present 
income, this error increases mobility. This is explicitly illustrated in Ashenfelter et al. (1986) for mobility 
analysis, but is implicitly treated in most text books of econometrics (see for example Greene 1997, pp. 436-
437). 
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2. Data 
The Pakistani panel data set used in this study was collected in 14 survey rounds from 1986 to 
1991 in four different districts, where around 800 households in 52 villages were tracked.4 
Three of the districts, Badin in Sind, Dir in North-West Frontier Province, and Attock in 
Punjab, were chosen purposively (so each district represents a stratum) as some of the poorest 
areas of rural Pakistan. The data is therefore not representative for Pakistan or rural Pakistan, 
but except for Faisalabad, which was selected as a more prosperous control district, it can be 
regarded as representative for the poor rural areas in Pakistan. Two markets within each 
district were chosen at random, making these market clusters the primary sampling units. For 
each of these markets, villages were divided into three categories5 according to their 
proximity to the particular market, and villages were then randomly chosen from each 
category. Then the households were drawn from a complete list of all families in each village. 
 The survey was conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
and the data were collected on a wide range of topics important to gauging the well-being of 
poor people. Considerable weight was put on measuring the rural households’ income from 
different sources, and also recorded a wide range of factors important to income change over 
time (Adams and He, 1995). An imputed value for income in kind was calculated, as well as 
for household consumption of crops and crop by-products and home-consumed livestock. It 
has been argued that expenditure is preferred over income as a more accurate measure of 
long-term economic well-being because of consumption smoothing. However, if the aim is to 
analyze the impact of disasters, and to compensate for the shock, then using consumption as 
the measure may blur the true impact due to informal insurance arrangements. Also, the 
procedure for collecting consumption data differed between the three first and the two last 
years. Hence, the expenditures were rendered incomparable between the two time periods of 
                                                 
4 Some households where observed only once, while other observations did not contain all the required 
information for our purposes.  Deleting these observations can be seen as random, and causes no bias in the 
remaining sample. Comparing the income data in our sample with the original data, we find no significant 
differences, see appendix 2 and 3. From the original data set, our sample consists of 685 households which are 
tracked each year.  
5 Villages were categorized by the following distances to the market: Those within 5 kilometres of the market, 
those within 5 to 10 kilometres and those within 10 to 20 kilometres. 
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different sampling methods, so we are unable to compare the income dynamics with the 
consumption dynamics. 
Since many people in these areas live in severe poverty, small income changes can 
determine whether or not a family is subjected to starvation. Thus, we are particularly 
interested in the household’s absolute income, as opposed to the relative rankings of 
households implicit in quintile analysis.6 Most government poverty statistics also focus on 
absolute income (Zheng 2001), and it is a clear advantage to provide policy recommendations 
on indicators regarded as important by the decision-makers. 
It is widely recognized that children need fewer calories than adults in order to 
function normally. However, there is no agreement on how this should be used to improve 
comparisons of households with different numbers of adult s and children. One argument 
against adjusting for caloric requirements has been that they differ according to the activity 
level of the individual and to individual heterogeneity for given activity level, but also that 
other nutrients are important in determining equivalence scales. A more important argument 
has been that even though the child needs fewer calories than adults, the child needs more of 
the household expenditure for education, clothing and medicine. So if the food component of 
total expenditure is low, there is little reason for adjusting for caloric needs (Lanjouw 2002). 
In our sample, food expenditure for the 3 first years accounts for 70% of total expenditure.7 
Hence, on average, food is dominant in the household budgets. Then the poor use an even 
larger proportion of their resources to meet the required food intake, and in this situation it 
seems necessary to adjust for different caloric requirements between adults and children. 
                                                 
6 Most studies of economic mobility ignore absolute income in transition matrices, and focus solely on relative 
income (quintiles). This is unfortunate because the relative categorisation will not capture general welfare trends, 
as for example increasing or decreasing living standards for the whole population over time. In addition, a 
relative poverty classification is quite arbitrary, and it is not clear why one should use a certain percentage point 
cut-off instead of another. Moreover, the percentage point chosen can influence the characteristics of those 
defined to be poor (Lanjouw, 2002). 
7 Reliable expenditure data where only collected for the first three years in our Pakistan panel data, so food’s 
share of total expenditure is calculated using the data from 1986/87 to 1988/89.  
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We therefore grouped the households by their absolute per-adult-equivalent 8 reported 
yearly income, which hereafter will be denoted income. According to the alternative food 
energy intake method an individual needs Kcal 2,100 per day, which could have been 
achieved with around Rs 2000 in income with the prices that prevailed in our time frame 
(McCulloch and Baulch, 2000). Hence, we take an income of Rs 2000 to serve as the poverty 
line in this study. 9 We classify those who have an income below Rs 2,000 as income class 1, 
and will frequently denote this group as “the poor”. Taking this class as a starting point and 
looking at the income distribution, it seems natural to divide the rest of the sample into the 
following groups: those who have an income between Rs 2000 - Rs3000, Rs 3000 – Rs 4000, 
Rs 4000 – Rs 5000 and those who earned more than Rs 5000, respectively. The distribution of 
households 
 
Table 1. Yearly distribution of households in each income category, by the absolute 
number of households. 
 
                  Year 
 
Income  
Category 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
3 
  
      4                5 
 
1 
138 
(20%) 
145 
(21%) 
173 
(25%) 
188 205 
    (27%)        (30%) 
 
2 
162 
(24%) 
160 
(23%) 
162 
(24%) 
187             153 
    (27%)        (22%) 
 
3 
122 
(18%) 
108 
(16%) 
131 
(19%) 
116            105 
     (17%)       (15%) 
 
4 
83 
(12%) 
74 
(11%) 
77 
(11%) 
66             68 
     (10%)        (10%) 
 
5 
180 
(26%) 
198 
(29%) 
142 
(21%) 
128            154 
     (19%)        (22%) 
Sum 685 
(100%) 
685 
(100%) 
685 
(100%) 
685            685 
    (100%)      (100%) 
 
                                                 
8 The adult-equivalent income is found by using the WHO caloric equivalent scale in table 4, and we also adjust 
for gender.  Hence, we assume that the costs of supporting a child decrease with the age of the child, but are 
linear in the number of children at each age. If one does not take account of the different costs, or if households 
face economies of size, then the standard method of dividing income according to household size would deem 
larger households to be poorer than what might be the case (Lanjouw and Ravallion 1995). 
9 Malik (1993) uses a similar absolute poverty line for rural Pakistan: Rs 1800 (in 1984/85 prices) per capita 
yearly expenditure, and also provides an overview of the work on Pakistan national household expenditure data. 
Alderman and Garcia (1993) uses the poorest quintile of a range of different per capita variables (expenditure, 
income calorie consumption, landless, food share and so on) to classify the poor in our IFPRI data, while Adams 
and He (1995) uses income per capita as the measuring rod for the same data. 
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As we can see from table 2 below, the mean income for the full sample seems to be 
fairly constant for the two first years, and then drops by approximately 11% from the second 
to the third year. For the three latter years, the income remains almost constant on the lower 
level. The picture of the poor is somewhat different. While the first year is the best in terms of 
mean income for the poor, the second year brings about a 12% reduction making this the 
worst year for this group. In the subsequent years, the poor household’s mean income level 
does not fluctuate much. 
Table 2 also reveals the unfavorable position of the poor; the mean income over the 5 
years for those who live below the poverty line is close to a quarter of the mean income for 
the non-poor. Also, it seems as though the fluctuations of the income of the poor over the 
years are negatively correlated with the variation of the full sample. 
 
Table 2. Yearly mean income for the full sample, for the non-poor and for the poor. 
 
Year Mean income for the 
full sample 
(std. deviation) 
Mean income for the 
non-poor 
(std. deviation) 
Mean income 
for the poor 
(std. deviation) 
1 4364 
(3989) 
5101  
(4145) 
1443 
(450) 
2 4411 
(3815) 
5259 
(3871) 
1251 
(534) 
3 3963 
(3678) 
4853  
(3860) 
1330 
(453) 
4 3802 
(3866) 
4725  
(4143) 
1359 
(924) 
5 4025 
(4725) 
5182  
(5221) 
1317 
(567) 
1 to 5 4113 
(4036) 
5027 
(4261) 
1338 
(625) 
 
To see whether there are any differences for the poor and the rich during the crises 
compared to normal times, we categorized households in income group 1 and 5 according to 
whether they lived in a district hit by a disaster. In 1986/87, crops were damaged in 
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Faisalabad due to a hailstorm at harvest time, Badin experienced flooding in September 1988 
and Attock was hit by drought in 1987/88 (Alderman and Garcia 1993, EIU 1988a,c,d, 1989). 
Irrigation and water supply are crucial factors in determining the impact of a drought, and 
most of Pakistan’s agricultural production came from irrigated areas in 1987/88. So even if 
larger parts of Pakistan were hit by the drought that started in 1987 (EIU 1988a), Attock was 
particularly vulnerable because of the very low ratio of irrigated lands. It is noted by EIU 
(1988b) that “The unprecedented drought which affected Pakistan last year during the 
summer monsoon season and which continued through the winter rain period has made its 
impact felt upon the unirrigated areas, but in the irrigated areas water supply seems to have 
been sufficient to overcome the worst effects.” In our sample, only 2 % of the land owned by 
the inhabitants of Attock was irrigated in 1987/88, while the ratio of irrigated land in 
Faisalabad, Badin and Dir was 100 %, 76 % and 27 %, respectively. Good weather conditions 
just before harvest time and a new record in cotton yields in Sind and Punjab in the third 
quarter of 1988 indicates that the drought was limited to 1987 and early 1988 (EIU 1988c,d). 
Hence, our income data collected in 1987/88 corresponds exactly to the period of the drought. 
We can see from table 3 that the mean income for the rich is approximately the same 
for households subjected to the crisis compared to those that experienced normal times. On 
the other hand, the poor households subjected to a disaster had a 10% lower mean income 
than the other poor. 
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Table 3. Income statistics during normal times and during crisis: for the poor and for 
those households with an income above 5000 Rupees. 
 
Income and state Number of 
observation
s 
Mean 
income 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum value  
All Rich 
802 9015 5808 5003 73222 
Rich  
Normal 664 9043 6014 5003 73222 
Rich  
Crises 138 8881 4709 5006 33108 
All  
Poor 849 1338 626 -9481 1999 
Poor  
Normal  720 1360 634 -9481 1999 
Poor  
Crises 129 1216 561 -354 1987 
 
From the kernel densities for the poor and the rich displayed in figure 1 below, it 
appears that the external shape of the income distribution for both groups was almost 
unaltered when a crisis occurred. We find no traceable effect of the crisis from the income 
distribution of the rich, while there is a somewhat larger proportion of the poor with lower 
incomes than in normal times. However, the actual role of the crisis for the poor is not easily 
traced by these static measures. Households that were better off may fall into income category 
1 because of the disaster, and this effect may actually lead to an increase in the mean income 
for that group. Hence, we need to make use of the panel dimension of the data and evaluate 
intra-distributional mobility to explore the full effect of the crisis. 
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Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income densities for the rich and the poor in normal times and in a crisis.
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3. Methodology 
We are interested in evaluating how large covariant shocks affect the income mobility of the 
rural poor compared to the rich. Then transition matrices can be a powerful tool to get a 
picture of income movement over time across states. Let { } { }1,05,4,3,2,1 ´=S  be the state 
space where a state Ss Î  is defined by ),( ky  where y is income class and k is an indicator of 
whether a crisis occurs, 1=k , or not, 0=k . The change in the crisis indicator over time can 
then be indexed by 0 and 1, so that the transition matrix between normal years can be denoted 
)]([ 0000 tpM ij=  where i  denotes income class in year t and j the class in t+1. Then the 
matrices for movements into and out of crisis can be denoted )]([ 0001 tpM ij=  and 
)]([ 0010 tpM ij= , respectively. Each of the elements in M then represents the probability of 
movement between income classes from year t to t+1, conditional on y at t and change in k.  
Assuming that the unknown probability of being hit by a disaster is q , then the true 
Markov transition matrix can be denoted ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é -
=L
1110
0100)1(
MM
MM qq
q  where 11M  is the 
transition matrix for two consecutive disasters.10 However, since we do not have any 
observations of households experiencing a crisis in two following years, we let 
1)1|0Pr( 1 === -tt kk , which implies that =11M 0. So if a disaster strikes at t, then y of the 
affected households follows 01M  from (t-1) to t, and then y follows 10M  with certainty from t  
to (t+1). In case no disaster occurs, which has the probability of )1( q- , then y follows 00M  
between any years. 
The true number of households with ijp  can be denoted )(tn ij , and the total number of 
transition counts in each row i of M can be denoted å
=
=
n
j
iji tntn
1
)()( . The first order Markov 
transition probabilities can then be estimated by maximum likelihood, and this estimator of 
)(tp ij  is given by  
 
(1) 
)(ˆ
)(ˆ
)(ˆ
tn
tn
tp
i
ij
ij =  
 
                                                 
10 There is not enough information in our sample to estimate q . 
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 where )(ˆ tn ij  and )(ˆ tn i  are the observed number of households moving from i to j and the 
observed number of households that started out in income class i, respectively. 11 That is, ijpˆ  
is the observed share of those which started in income class i that ends up in income class j. 
Then let )](ˆ[)(ˆ tptM ij=  denote the estimated transition matrix. 
Inference from a single transition matrix on a sample requires strong simplifying 
assumptions (Atkinson et al. 1992). First, one assumes that the same transition probabilities 
apply to all households (population homogeneity). We divide our sample into two main 
categories, those hit by a disaster and those who are not, and thus assume a different mobility 
pattern for each group. The second standard assumption is that transition probabilities are 
constant over time. In our framework, however, we not only allow the matrices to vary over 
time, but more importantly, we investigate whether the probabilities for those affected by a 
crisis differ over time. We calculate the transition probabilities of households moving into a 
disaster and compare them with households moving out of the same state.  
The last assumption usually implicitly employed in work using these matrices is the 
first order Markov assumption: A transition probability is independent of past history. We 
also use this assumption, but see Schluter (1997) for some evidence that the income in year (t-
1) also influences the transition probability from year t to year (t+1). However, even if 
second-order Markov processes are better approximations to reality than first order processes 
in most circumstances, it is reasonable to believe that the first order impact of natural disasters 
like the ones present in our data will be much larger than eventual second order effects. Due 
to the usual constraints, the application of the second-order model is left for future research.  
When constructing the income transition matrices, we separate the income movement 
of the households in the three districts that were hit by a natural disaster. Excluding these 
observations, we construct a matrix that represents the movement for the households when no 
crisis occurred, and let this represent the “normal” movement. In order to distinguish between 
the mobility experiences when households enter or exit a year of crises, one matrix is 
calculated for each event. The first matrix includes only observations where households move 
from a normal year and into a year of crises, the “entering crises matrix”. The second, the 
                                                 
11 See Schluter (1997) for the explicit derivations of the ML estimator. 
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“exiting crises matrix”, is restricted to those observations where households move from a year 
of crisis and into a normal year.  
Calculating Mˆ  is straightforward, but evaluating the statistical significance of the 
transition probabilities can be more cumbersome because the analytical estimate of the 
standard deviation of )(ˆ tp ij  is very difficult to calculate. We therefore propose a simple 
bootstrap procedure to obtain estimates of these standard errors of each of the estimators of 
the transition probabilities.12 In order to preserve the original panel’s potential information 
about the impacts of crises on household mobility, each household must be treated as a 
cluster. So when we draw households randomly with replacement to create a new sample iN  
with the same size as the original sample N , then each draw not only contains that particular 
household’s 5-year income category record but also indicators of whether the movement 
between years is classified as normal, into-crisis or out of crisis. The new sample is then used 
to calculate the particular transition matrix iij
i tptP )](ˆ[)(ˆ = , which we store.13 Replicating this 
procedure as many times as practically feasible yields a set of estimates of each transition 
probability of )(tM . Thus, T bootstrap replications yields Tij
i
ijijij pppp ˆ...,ˆ,...ˆ,ˆ
21  for ],1[, nji Î , 
which represents an estimate of the true distribution of each of the transition probabilities. 
This estimate of the distribution of )(tp ij  is then used to calculate confidence intervals.  
Even if we are able to apply the bootstrap and construct an estimate of the distribution 
of the transition probabilities, the possibly severe problem of data imperfections still remains. 
It is very likely that our income data, as is frequently the case with household income data 
from developing countries, is measured with error (Alderman and Garcia, 1993).14 This stems 
not only from the difficulty of measuring all the relevant variables that compile to househo ld 
income, as for example to calculate the correct return from assets, or from recall bias, 
seasonality and long questionnaires. More important, especially for the societies we study 
where agriculture is a major income source, seems to be that personal and farm incomings and 
                                                 
12 The idea of using the sample data to generate an estimate of the true distribution stems from Efron (1979). 
13 The computation was performed in Stata, but the xttrans command does not allow storage of each element in 
)(ˆ tP . The do-file modifying the xttrans command and the bootstrap programs are available upon request. 
14 Note also that as long as the income bins in the matrix are exogenously determined, transition matrices are 
robust against contamination (Cowell and Schluter 1998). 
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outgoings are often mixed (Deaton 1997). Since it is not necessary for a household to separate 
consumption expenditure from the outlays on farm inputs, errors in income data may arise 
from the difficulty in deducting the correct cost of production from the receipts. In addition, 
the net value of home-produced food, which also tends to be an important component of a 
poor rural household’s income, is difficult to measure particularly when there are no well 
functioning markets for these items. 
A few studies have attempted systematically to evaluate the impact of measurement 
error on mobility measures. Rendtel et al. (1998) categorize households according to two 
independent measures of the same income variable. Then if the two variables classify a 
household in two different categories, for example as poor by one and non-poor by the other, 
this is taken as evidence of measurement error. However, their assertion that identical 
categorizations by the two measures provide evidence for a true change between poverty 
states requires rather strong assumptions. It is straightforward to show that if the measurement 
error is correlated in the two measures of income, this could result in identical but false 
classifications. So even if one posits two independently measured income variables, this 
approach requires measurement errors in the two income variables to be relatively 
uncorrelated. 
Bound et al. (1991) correct for measurement error by eliminating one-period spells of 
poverty, which is also the approach in Bane and Ellwood (1986) for changes in income less 
than one-half of the income to poverty- line ratio. Eliminating several one-year spells of 
poverty seems not to be plausible for studies of societies with a high true inter-year mobility 
because it would omit a large part of the actual changes in welfare. Moreover, it is not clear 
that one can attribute short spells of poverty to measurement errors even in societies where 
income is more stable. 
A general framework for analyzing the impact of measurement  error on income 
mobility is proposed in McGarry (1995), where a variance components model containing a 
white noise error term is estimated. This component is then treated as an approximation of the 
error in observed income. Because this method includes any true random income shocks in 
the measurement error term, correcting for the stochastic variance provides a lower bound of 
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poverty rates. Hence, this approach is appropriate as long as the true random shocks are small 
compared to measurement error, which may be hard to verify. 
Taking the static headcount index of poverty as a starting point, we know from 
Ravallion (1988) that a measurement error that increases variability in the welfare variable 
causes the expected value of the index to increase if the poverty line is less than the mode 
welfare and if the individual welfare function is quasi-concave. Looking at this index for a 
panel, one can classify the households that are defined as poor in every period as the “always 
poor”. Now, even if measurement error increases the number of poor in every period, the 
empirical study in McGarry (1995) suggests that the same error causes the number of “always 
poor” to be biased downwards. She states that the reason is that the increased variability from 
the error causes several false transitions out of poverty, in at least one period, for those who in 
reality did not move upwards. However, the analytical derivation of this result seems to be 
impossible to calculate, and one might wonder if this error also works in the opposite 
direction, i.e. that some non-poor are classified as always poor due to measurement errors.  
In order to assess the direction and magnitude of measurement errors on the transition 
matrices derived from our data, assume now that our measured income variable, *y , 
represents the true structure of the data. Then we can simulate how a typical measurement 
error influences mobility matrices by calculating a new “observed” income, y  , which has 
been influenced by a mean zero normal distributed random error term itu  that is uncorrelated 
over years and has a variance 2us  :  
 
(2) ititit uyy +=
* ,      where   ),0(~ 2uit Nu s   
 
The error may either be multiplicative or additive, so we simulate each type for a wide range 
of plausible variances to see if any differences in the impact on transitions emerge. The 
impacts of the errors on the matrices are discussed next.  
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4. Impacts of disasters on income mobility using noisy data 
Since we are particularly interested in the mobility of the poor in the aftermath of the 
disasters, we set up two hypotheses for the movement from a year of crisis into a normal year. 
The first is that the year after the disaster may be a recovery year, in which many households 
experiencing temporary bad fortune during the shock would move upwards when their 
incomes returned to a normal level. If life went back to normal after the disaster, we could 
expect the probability of remaining poor to be equal to or lower than the normal-to-normal 
transition probability. This is because we expect the number of poor to be larger during the 
crisis, and when things return to normal, ordinary income movement suggests that (1) will be 
lower than normal since the denominator is larger. Those affected by the disaster might also 
work harder than normal to compensate for the loss, or they might receive transfers or 
benefits from other formal or informal insurance mechanisms. In this case, the poor might get 
a higher income the year following the shock compared to normal times, which also implies a 
lower than normal probability of remaining poor. Equality between the two might be the 
result if the chances of improving their income were exactly as before the shock. Thus, the 
recovery hypothesis cannot be rejected if we find that the exiting matrix is not significantly 
different from the normal matrix or if the probability of escaping poverty is larger compared 
to a normal situation. 
Our second hypothesis was that a disaster in one year might lead to depressed incomes 
also in the subsequent year. This might be the result if the disaster led to erosion of productive 
capital, either by depletion of capital for consumption purposes or by direct damage to 
assets.15 In addition, floods may damage important infrastructure like roads, and the aftermath 
of natural disasters may bring pest infestation. 16 If productive assets were run down, we 
would expect the probability of rising out of poverty to be lower than normal in the aftermath 
of the crisis. Another reason for the spillover may be that in the year after the disaster, there 
                                                 
15 Livestock died both during the drought in Attock in 1987/88 and the flood in Badin in 1988 (EIU 1988c). 
Floods are known to cause erosion of productive soil and damage trees. 
16 One example of pests following in the aftermath of natural disasters is the 1988 flood in Pakistan, where the 
following pest infestation damaging cotton production was believed to have been caused by of the flood (EIU 
1988c). 
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will often be a reduced demand for individual providing services. This may reduce the 
incomes of the poor, since these groups get a substantial share of their incomes from such 
occupations.17 From this reasoning, we would expect the probability of remaining poor to be 
somewhere between the probabilities in the entering matrix and the normal matrix: Worse 
than a normal transition, but better than being hit by a shock.  
The transition matrices for the three states are displayed in table 4. The bootstrap, as 
described in section 3, was performed to construct estimates of the true distribution of each 
transition probability. The resulting estimates of the transition probabilities’ standard errors 
are displayed below together with the estimate of the transition probability from the original 
sub-sample.18 
 
                                                 
17 As Sen (1981) notes, one will frequently see a dramatic fall in the demand for barbers and tailors after drought. 
For the decomposition of non-farm income sources, at least for the three first years of our panel, see Adams 
(1994). 
18 Note that the estimates of the transition probabilities are from the original sample, and not from the bootstraps. 
This is because any bias in the estimates from the original sample will be exaggerated in estimates from the 
bootstrapped samples (StataCorp 2001). 
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Table 4. Transition matrices according to movement relative to the crisis. 
 
Income class  1: 2000Rsy £  
  2: 30002000 RsyRs £<  
  3: 40003000 RsyRs £<  
  4: 50004000 RsyRs £<  
  5: 5000Rsy >  
 
 
Normal matrix 
Income class in year (t+1) 
      1              2                3              4            5          Total 
Income class in year t          1 
 
                                             2 
 
                                             3 
 
                                             4 
 
                                             5 
 
                                      Total 
48 
(2.5) 
 
31 
(2.0) 
 
14 
(1.9) 
 
12 
(2.4) 
 
5 
(1.1) 
 
24 
27 
(2.2) 
 
32 
(2.2) 
 
28 
(2.5) 
 
23 
(3.0) 
 
10 
(1.6) 
 
25 
11 
(1.5) 
 
17 
(1.7) 
 
24 
(2.4) 
 
21 
(2.8) 
 
15 
(1.8) 
 
17 
6 
(1.2) 
 
9 
(1.3) 
 
15 
(2.0) 
 
14 
(2.5) 
 
16 
(1.8) 
 
11 
7 
(1.3) 
 
12 
(1.5) 
 
20 
(2.3) 
 
30 
(3.3) 
 
54 
(2.8) 
 
23 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
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Entering shocks matrix 
Income class in year (t+1) 
      1              2                3              4            5          Total 
Income class in year t          1 
 
                                             2 
 
                                             3 
 
                                             4 
 
                                             5 
 
                                       Total 
67 
(5.4) 
 
35 
(5.4) 
 
18 
(4.9) 
 
11 
(4.7) 
 
6 
(2.3) 
 
28 
16 
(4.2) 
 
30 
(5.1) 
 
34 
(5.9) 
 
22 
(6.2) 
 
11 
(3.0) 
 
21 
9 
(3.4) 
 
20 
(4.6) 
 
18 
(4.8) 
 
20 
(6.0) 
 
17 
(3.7) 
 
17 
5 
(2.6) 
 
9 
(3.2) 
 
12 
(4.1) 
 
17 
(5.7) 
 
11 
(3.0) 
 
10 
3 
(1.8) 
 
6 
(2.7) 
 
17 
(4.7) 
 
30 
(6.9) 
 
56 
(4.9) 
 
24 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
Exiting shocks matrix 
Income class in year (t+1) 
      1              2                3              4            5          Total 
Income class in year t          1 
 
                                             2 
 
                                             3 
 
                                             4 
 
                                             5 
 
                                       Total 
55 
(4.4) 
 
38 
(4.7) 
 
20 
(4.1) 
 
27 
(6.3) 
 
9 
(2.5) 
 
30 
25 
(3.8) 
 
33 
(4.6) 
 
32 
(4.8) 
 
35 
(6.7) 
 
10 
(2.6) 
 
25 
12 
(2.8) 
 
19 
(3.8) 
 
20 
(4.1) 
 
22 
(5.8) 
 
20 
(3.5) 
 
18 
4 
(1.7) 
 
6 
(2.3) 
 
11 
(3.1) 
 
6 
(3.3) 
 
12 
(2.8) 
 
8 
5 
(1.9) 
 
6 
(2.3) 
 
18 
(4.0) 
 
10 
(4.2) 
 
49 
(4.2) 
 
20 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
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4.1 Implications for the poor  
In order to compare the magnitude of any post-crisis effects with the actual disaster, we start 
by analyzing the income mobility for households that are in a normal situation in one year and 
experience a disaster in the next. 
4.1.1 Direct effects of disasters 
In a given normal year, almost ha lf of the households below the poverty line (income class 1) 
remain poor in the proceeding year. However, this group has a much lower probability of 
rising out of poverty when the sample enters a disaster. More than two-thirds of those below 
the poverty line remain in that group when the negative shock occurs in the subsequent year. 
To evaluate the robustness of this result, we use the bootstrapped distribution of the 
probability estimates. Constructing 99% confidence intervals from this estimated distribution 
shows that the large discrepancy between the two estimates of transition probabilities for the 
poorest group moving from a normal to normal situation contra moving from a normal into a 
shock year is highly significant. Moreover, we find that even very large measurement error 
would not influence this conclusion, as is evident from table 5.19 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 To find plausible values of the measurement errors, we compared the “true” income variance with the income 
variance after being influenced by m (see table 2). Whether the error is additive or multiplicative has a large 
impact on the contribution of the error to measured variance. For example, we find from the Monte Carlo 
experiments that the “true” income variance accounts for approximately 80%, 60% and 50% of the observed 
income variance for the poor in the first year when m~N(0, 600 ), m~N(0, 1000), m~N(0, 1500) . However, for 
incomes below 2000 Rupees, the multiplicative error does not change the variance of the true income for errors 
with a standard deviation of less than 20% of income. For larger errors, we find that m~N(0, 0.3adjY) and  
m~N(0, 0.4adjY)  accounts for 6% and 20 %, respectively, of the observed variance of the  income of the poor. 
For our purpose, however, the importance of the error lies in how it affects the transition matrices, not in its 
share of observed income variance. 
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Table 5. Monte Carlo simulations of the impact of a multiplicative measurement error 
on the probability of remaining poor in normal times and when entering a crisis, 
according to variability of the error.20 
 
 
Staying probabilities: ),(11 xtp  
 Entering 
crises 
Normal Difference 
entering-normal 
Sample 0.67 0.48 0.19 
m~ N(0, 0.05adjY) 0.65 0.48 0.17 
m~ N(0, 0.10adjY) 0.64 0.48 0.16 
m~ N(0, 0.15adjY) 0.63 0.48 0.15 
m~ N(0, 0.20adjY) 0.61 0.47 0.14 
m~ N(0, 0.25adjY) 0.59 0.47 0.12 
m~ N(0, 0.40adjY) 0.54 0.45 0.10 
 
Table 5 shows that the larger the multiplicative measurement error, the lower is the difference 
between the probability of remaining poor during normal times and the same probability when 
entering a shock. This indicates that the gap between these two sample estimates, which 
amounts to 19 percentage points, represents a lower bound of the discrepancy between the 
true transition probabilities in these two situations. This result is also sustained if the error is 
additive, see appendix 6, table A6.1. 
A similar picture can be depicted for the poor households’ chances of improving their 
position under the different circumstances. In a normal-to-normal transition we find that the 
poor have almost a 70% higher chance of moving one income class upwards, compared to the 
same movement in a normal-to-shock situation. Thus, there is a much higher probability of 
rising out of poverty when the households are not affected by shocks, which is not a 
surprising result. This is also a robust finding, indicated by the fact that this estimate of the 
normal-to-normal (normal-to-shock) transition probability is not contained in the 95% 
confidence interval of the normal-to-shock (normal-to-normal) distribution. In addition, this 
finding is also robust against measurement error in that the gap between the estimates 
represents a lower bound.21 
                                                 
20 We use 1000 repetitions in measurement error simulations in this paper. 
21 See the impact of simulated measurement error on these estimates in appendix 6 table A6.2 for an additive 
error and appendix 7, table A7.1 for a multiplicative error.  
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That entering a shock severely worsens the situation in terms of income mobility for 
the poor is also indicated by the probability estimates of households in income class 2 that 
move one class down. If the subsequent year is normal, these households have a 31% chance 
of moving down, while the probability rises to 35% if they enter a year of shock instead. 
However, the difference between the two is statistically rather weak. Even if the normal-to-
shock probability is not present in a 95% confidence interval of the corresponding normal-to-
normal distribution, we cannot reject the possibility that this latter estimate is not contained in 
confidence intervals of the former, even if we narrow the interval considerably. The 
simulations of the measurement errors support the hypothesis that households in income class 
2 did not have a different probability of moving one class down when entering a shock. The 
probability in normal times for this movement is very robust against small and medium errors, 
while the corresponding probability for those who enter a crisis increased relatively much for 
small errors.22 Hence, measurement error may account for the observed differences in the 
respective probabilities. 
4.1.2 Recovery in the aftermath of the disaster?  
Now compare the mobility of the poor in the exit matrix with the normal matrix in figure 1. 
We find a seven percentage point higher probability of remaining poor when moving from a 
year of crisis to a normal year compared to transitions between normal years 23. This amounts 
to a 15 % higher probability of remaining poor, which must be said to be considerable 
because the crisis in fact ended the previous year. This supports the hypothesis that the 
negative impact on the poorest spills over to the year after the shock. We also find that this 
result is very robust against likely measurement error.24 
 
                                                 
22 See appendix 6, table A6.3 and appendix 7, table A7.2. 
23 The existence of a spillover from the shocks is supported by our estimates (bootstraps) of the distribution of 
the probabilities. This is suggested because the estimate of the movement of the poorest group from a year of 
shock and into a normal year (55%) is not contained in the 99% confidence interval of the “normal to normal” 
year distribution of the same income group and movement. Similarly, but not as significant, the estimate of the 
probability of going from a normal to normal year (48%) is not contained in an 87% confidence interval for the 
shock to normal year distribution.  
24 The same result is found if the error is additive, see appendix 6, table A6.1.  
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Table 6: Monte Carlo simulations of the impact of a multiplicative measurement error 
on the probability of remaining poor in normal times and when exiting a crisis, 
according to variability of the error. 
 
Staying probabilities: ),(11 xtp  
 Normal Exiting 
crisis 
Difference 
Exiting-normal 
Sample 0.48 0.55 0.07 
m~ N(0, 0.05adjY) 0.48 0.54 0.06 
m~ N(0, 0.10adjY) 0.48 0.54 0.06 
m~ N(0, 0.15adjY) 0.48 0.54 0.06 
m~ N(0, 0.20adjY) 0.47 0.54 0.07 
m~ N(0, 0.25adjY) 0.47 0.54 0.07 
m~ N(0, 0.40adjY) 0.45 0.51 0.06 
 
We also find a similar result for those that start out in income class 2 and fall into 
poverty the subsequent year. There is more than a 20% higher probability for households in 
group 2 of falling into poverty if a shock occurred in the previous year compared to 
movement between normal years. However, neither the probability of remaining in income 
class 2, nor the probability of moving out of poverty and into income class 2 differs 
significantly between the two matrices.  
Taken together, these findings indicate that the situation does not revert back to the 
normal mobility when moving from a year of shock to a normal year. Rather, this provides 
support for there being relatively large negative spillovers over time for poor households 
subjected to the crisis. This may explain the observation that there is a larger share of poor 
households in the year after the shock (30%) compared to the normal year share (24%). 
The next step is thus to investigate the magnitude of this spillover on mobility in 
comparison to the impact of the actual disaster. From the exiting shocks matrix and the 
entering shocks matrix, we find that there is a significantly lower probability of remaining in 
poverty for a household moving out (55 %) compared to moving into a shock (67 %)25. Note 
also that households starting out in income group 2 have approximately the same probability 
of being impoverished the year after, irrespective of whether they enter or exit a shock.26 
                                                 
25 Neither of the estimates are included in the other’s 95% confidence interval. 
26 For plausible confidence intervals, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the probability is the same in the 
entering matrix and the exiting matrix for households in income class 2 of moving one class down. 
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Thus, households that are close to the poverty line are just as inclined to fall below the line 
whether they are subjected to a shock or to the spillover effect.  
When it comes to opportunities to move out of poverty, however, we see that the 
probability of moving from the poorest group and into income class 2 is close to 60 % higher 
when exiting a shock compared to entering one. So when moving from a year of shock, the 
situation for poor people climbing from group one to two is very similar to the normal 
situation. The same can be said for those that remain in income group two; this transition 
probability is not significantly different irrespective of which matrix we study. 
Before we turn to the more privileged households, we summarize our most important 
findings. When a shock occurs in a particular year, there will be a significant negative 
spillover in the subsequent year that reduces the households’ probability of moving out of 
poverty, and increases the probability of falling into poverty for those just above the poverty 
line. While the shock has a much more severe effect on the poor, by increasing the probability 
of remaining poor by 40% compared to normal, we find that the spillover effect is also 
substantial. A movement from a crisis to a normal year increases the probability of remaining 
poor by approximately 15% compared to mobility for households not directly hurt by a shock. 
 
4.2 Implications for the privileged 
4.2.1 Entering shocks 
The households in the upper income levels seem to have experienced the disasters very 
differently from the poor in terms of the mobility pattern. There is no significant difference in 
the probability of remaining in the highest income class (5) between normal to normal years 
and normal to shock years. One reason may be that the income class 5 has no upper bound. 
Thus, it might well be that these households are hurt by the disaster, but that most of them 
have such a high income that the reduction does not bring them down the income ladder more 
than normal. However, if the households are evenly distributed over the income range, we 
would expect that being hit by a disaster would increase the transitions from the upper to the 
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lower classes. Note also that these differences are very robust against measurement errors, see 
appendices 6 and 7, tables A6.4 and A7.3. 
The probability of moving from the highest class to income class 4 is larger for a 
transition from a normal to normal year (16%) than one from a normal to a shock year (11%). 
This difference is significant on the basis of a 95% confidence interval for the normal to 
normal distribution, and a 87% interval for the normal to shock distribution. It is also 
remarkable that there is the same probability of going up from class 4 to 5 in the two cases, 
which we take as support for a hypothesis that richer households do not experience very 
different mobility patterns when a shock occurs compared to normal times. Likewise, the 
probability of staying in income class 4 in the two different situations seems to be the same. 
The probability of remaining in class 4 in normal to normal years (14%) is included in narrow 
confidence intervals of the normal to shock distribution, which indicates that the two 
situations may not be significantly different with respect to transition probabilities. The 
probability of staying in income group 4 when entering a shock (17%) is not included in 
confidence intervals wider than the 85%, which indicates that there is some chance that the 
probabilities are different. Taken together, however, we reject the hypothesis that the two 
situations are different in terms of transition probabilities. 
 Looking at possible lagged effects, it seems as though going from a disaster into a 
normal year implies less opportunities for income generation for higher income groups than 
both the two other types of transitions. To see this, note that those in income group 5 had a 
probability of 49 % of remaining in this group when moving out of the disaster and into a 
normal year, compared to 54 % in a normal transition. This aspect is also reflected in the 
proportion of households in the two upper categories being larger in normal situations (34%) 
compared to the movement from a disaster (27%), and that the probability of falling from 
category 4 and 5 to 1 is twice as large in the latter situation (compared to normal to normal 
transition). Note also that the probabilities for households starting in group 4 (5) in a normal 
year of being in group 4 or 5 in a year of shock is 47% (67%), which is close to the normal to 
normal year transition probability. Summing up for the upper income groups, then, it seems 
that the only impact of natural disasters on income mobility is a small negative lagged effect. 
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5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to use some “natural experiments” to investigate the impact of natural 
disasters on the income mobility of rural households in Pakistan, and to propose some 
methodological procedures for evaluating the robustness of transition matrices. In addition to 
the expected result that the poor have a higher probability of remaining poor when entering a 
crisis compared to normal times, a main result is that there seems to be a substantial negative 
effect in the following year. Moreover, the poor have a 15% higher probability of remaining 
poor in the so called “recovery phase” after a disaster, compared to normal mobility. The 
more privileged households, to the contrary, seem not to be much affected by the crisis. We 
find no other impact than a slightly higher probability of moving out of the most favorable 
income group the year after the crisis (compared to normal movement). These results suggest 
that crisis relief for the poor should not only be provided during a natural disaster, but should 
also be maintained through the subsequent year in order to avoid increased impoverishment. 
We propose a simple bootstrap method to facilitate statistical inference based on 
mobility matrices, and construct confidence intervals for the probability estimates. We 
illustrate the potential magnitude of measurement error on transition matrices and find that 
relatively small errors may induce a substantial downward bias of the probability of remaining 
poor. More encouragingly, however, simulating different types of measurement error gives a 
reasonable foundation for evaluating the impact of measurement error, in particular for 
comparison of the probabilities of remaining poor. 
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Appendix 1: Adult equivalents  
 
The scale is based on calorie requirements from the WHO, which is the same scale 
McCulloch and Baulch (2000) use for this IFPRI data set . 
 
Age Male weight Female weight 
0-1 0.33 0.33 
1-2 0.46 0.46 
2-3 0.54 0.54 
3-5 0.62 0.62 
5-7 0.74 0.70 
7-10 0.84 0.72 
10-12 0.88 0.78 
12-14 0.96 0.84 
14-16 1.06 0.86 
16-18 1.14 0.86 
18-30 1.04 0.80 
30-60 1.00 0.82 
60+ 0.84 0.74 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Comparing the original data with our sample: Yearly household income for 
all households  
 
 
 
Original data 
 
Our sample 
 
 
N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. 
Year 1 734 29368 34223 685 28911 33072 
Year 2 734 34430 33928 685 34091 34047 
Year 3 734 
733* 
34877 
33577* 
48447 
33286* 
685 33463 33162 
Year 4 752 37246 
 
50138 
 
685 36230 46916 
Year 5 730 
729* 
47019 
43825* 
99485 
49538* 
685 42969 47999 
 * Deleting one outlier 
 
  32 
Appendix 3: Comparing the original data with our sample: Yearly household income for 
the poorest and the richest households. 
To investigate whether our sample is skewed in the tails compared to the original data set, we 
divided the households in two categories reflecting the rich and the poor. Here, the poor 
households are those who have a household income of 10000 Rupees or less, while the rich 
are defined by an income level above 60000 Rupees. Note that these figures are not deflated. 
As we can see, there are no significant differences between the statistics. 
 
 
Original data 
A) Y<10000 
B) Y>60000 
Our sample 
A) Y<10000 
B) Y>60000 
 
N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. 
A 121 6900 2396 110 6771 2412 Year 1        
B 66 101085 75522 58 100150 74898 
A 99 5994 2995 93 5958 3050 Year 2       
                   
B 106 100102 42911 95 101365 44366 
A 98 6805 2686 89 6780 2711 Year 3 
B 96 
95* 
110088 
100848* 
101378 
45872* 
85 101515 47766 
A 73 5157 11218 65 5353 11685 Year 4 
B 96 
 
127734 
 
95353 
 
83 123562 90588 
A 61 5753 4354 56 5920 4418 Year 5 
B 144 
143* 
133410 
117732* 
200739 
70255* 
130 116396 68474 
 * Deleting one outlier 
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Appendix 4: Quintile matrices. 
   
 
Entering shocks  
quintile matrix 
Income quintile in year (t+1) 
      1              2                3              4            5          Total 
Income quintile in year t      1 
 
                                             2      
 
                                             3 
 
                                             4 
 
                                             5 
 
                                       Total 
62 
 
35 
 
19 
 
9 
 
6 
 
26 
14 
 
20 
 
24 
 
18 
 
5 
 
16 
15 
 
26 
 
19 
 
20 
 
10 
 
18 
8 
 
15 
 
27 
 
29 
 
17 
 
19 
1 
 
5 
 
11 
 
24 
 
61 
 
21 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
 
  
 
Normal quintile matrix 
Income quintile in year (t+1) 
      1              2                3              4            5          Total 
Income quintile in year t      1 
                                              
2           
 
                                             3 
 
                                             4 
 
                                             5 
 
                                       Total 
41 
 
23 
 
14 
 
8 
 
4 
 
18 
24 
 
30 
 
23 
 
15 
 
7 
 
20 
18 
 
24 
 
26 
 
23 
 
12 
 
21 
11 
 
16 
 
23 
 
30 
 
23 
 
21 
7 
 
7 
 
13 
 
24 
 
54 
 
21 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
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Exit shocks  
quintile matrix 
Income quintile in year (t+1) 
      1              2                3              4            5          Total 
Income quintile in year t      1 
 
                                             2        
 
                                             3 
 
                                             4 
 
                                             5 
 
                                       Total 
48 
 
29 
 
19 
 
20 
 
3 
 
24 
25 
 
29 
 
27 
 
21 
 
10 
 
22 
16 
 
23 
 
24 
 
20 
 
15 
 
19 
7 
 
14 
 
22 
 
27 
 
23 
 
18 
5 
 
6 
 
9 
 
12 
 
48 
 
17 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
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Appendix 5: Kernel density functions of log income for those households that were 
subjected to a covariant shock and for those that were not hurt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
lnadjy
 shock  normal
0 5 10 15
0
.2
.4
.6
lnadjy
 shock  the year after shock
0 5 10 15
0
.2
.4
.6
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Appendix 6: Monte Carlo simulations of the impact on transition probabilities in the 
normal matrix, crisis matrix and exiting matrix of an additive measurement error, 
according to variability of the error. 
 
Table A6.1. The probability of remaining poor. 
 
Staying probabilities: P11 
 Entering 
crises 
Normal Exiting 
crisis 
Difference 
entering-normal 
Difference 
Exiting-normal 
Sample 0.67 0.48 0.55 0.19 0.07 
M N(0,200) 0.64 0.47 0.54 0.17 0.07 
M N(0,400) 0.60 0.46 0.53 0.14 0.07 
M N(0.600) 0.56 0.44 0.51 0.12 0.07 
M N(0,800 0.53 0.42 0.49 0.11 0.07 
M N(0,1000) 0.50 0.41 0.47 0.09 0.06 
M N(0.1500) 0.46 0.39 0.45 0.07 0.06 
 
 
Table A6.2. A poor household’s probability of moving one class up. 
 
P12 
 Entering 
crises 
Normal Exiting 
crisis 
Difference 
entering-normal 
Difference 
Exiting-normal 
Sample 0.16 0.27 0.25 -0.11 -0.02 
M N(0, 200) 0.18 0.27 0.25 -0.09 -0.02 
M N(0, 400) 0.20 0.27 0.25 -0.07 -0.02 
M N(0, 600) 0.21 0.26 0.26 -0.05  0.00 
M N(0, 800) 0.22 0.25 0.25 -0.03  0.00 
M N(0, 1000) 0.21 0.23 0.24 -0.02  0.01 
M N(0, 1500) 0.19 0.19 0.19 -0.00  0.00 
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Table A6.3. The probability for households in income class 2 of becoming poor. 
 
 
P21 
 Entering 
crises 
Normal Exiting 
crisis 
Difference 
entering-normal 
Difference 
Exiting-normal 
Sample 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.04 0.07 
M N(0, 200) 0.37 0.31 0.37 0.06 0.06 
M N(0, 400) 0.37 0.31 0.37 0.06 0.06 
M N(0, 600) 0.38 0.32 0.38 0.06 0.06 
M N(0, 800) 0.38 0.32 0.38 0.06 0.06 
M N(0, 1000) 0.38 0.33 0.39 0.05 0.06 
M N(0, 1500) 0.38 0.34 0.39 0.04 0.05 
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Table A6.4. The probability for households in income class 5 of remaining in class 5. 
 
Staying probabilities: P55 
 Entering 
crises 
Normal Exiting 
crisis 
Difference 
entering-normal 
Difference 
Exiting-normal 
Sample 0.56 0.54 0.49 0.02 -0.06 
M N(0,200) 0.55 0.54 0.47 0.01 -0.07 
M N(0,400) 0.54 0.54 0.46 0.00 -0.08 
M N(0.600) 0.54 0.53 0.45 0.01 -0.08 
M N(0,800 0.54 0.53 0.44 0.01 -0.09 
M N(0,1000) 0.53 0.52 0.43 0.01 -0.09 
M N(0.1500) 0.51 0.49 0.43 0.02 -0.06 
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Appendix 7: Monte Carlo simulations of the impact on the transition probabilities in the 
normal matrix, crisis matrix and exiting matrix of a multiplicative measurement error, 
according to variability of the error. 
 
TableA7.1. A poor household’s probability of moving one class up. 
 
P12 
 Entering 
crises 
Normal Exiting 
crisis 
Difference 
entering-normal 
Difference 
Exiting-normal 
Sample 0.16 0.27 0.25 -0.11 -0.02 
M N(0, 0.05adjY) 0.17 0.27 0.25 -0.10 -0.02 
M N(0, 0.10adjY) 0.17 0.27 0.25 -0.10 -0.02 
M N(0, 0.15adjY) 0.18 0.26 0.25 -0.08 -0.01 
M N(0, 0.20adjY) 0.19 0.25 0.24 -0.06 -0.01 
M N(0, 0.25adjY) 0.19 0.25 0.23 -0.06 -0.02 
M N(0, 0.40adjY) 0.19 0.22 0.21 -0.03 -0.01 
 
 
 
Table A7.2. The probability of a household in income class 2 of becoming poor in the 
next period. 
 
Staying probabilities: P21 
 Entering 
crises 
Normal Exiting 
crisis 
Difference 
entering-normal 
Difference 
Exiting-normal 
Sample 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.04 0.07 
M N(0, 0.05adjY) 0.38 0.31 0.37 0.07 0.06 
M N(0, 0.10adjY) 0.37 0.31 0.37 0.06 0.06 
M N(0, 0.15adjY) 0.37 0.31 0.37 0.06 0.06 
M N(0, 0.20adjY) 0.37 0.31 0.38 0.06 0.07 
M N(0, 0.25adjY) 0.37 0.32 0.38 0.05 0.06 
M N(0, 0.40adjY) 0.40 0.36 0.41 0.04 0.05 
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Table A7.3. The probability of remaining in income class 5. 
 
 
 
Staying probabilities: P55 
 Entering 
crises 
Normal Exiting 
crisis 
Difference 
entering-normal 
Difference 
Exiting-normal 
Sample 0.56 0.54 0.49 0.02 -0.05 
M N(0, 0.05adjY) 0.55 0.54 0.47 0.01 -0.07 
M N(0, 0.10adjY) 0.54 0.54 0.45 0.00 -0.09 
M N(0, 0.15adjY) 0.53 0.53 0.44 0.00 -0.09 
M N(0, 0.20adjY) 0.52 0.51 0.43 0.01 -0.08 
M N(0, 0.25adjY) 0.51 0.50 0.42 0.01 -0.08 
M N(0, 0.40adjY) 0.47 0.46 0.39 0.01 -0.07 
 
 
  
Summary 
We evaluate the impact of disasters on income mobility by drawing on 
“natural experiments”. While the poor have a much higher probability 
of remaining poor when entering a crisis compared to normal times, 
there is also a negative effect in the year after. Richer households 
seem to be unaffected. A simple bootstrap method is proposed to 
facilitate statistical inference for mobility matrices. Also, we simulate 
measurement error to illustrate its magnitude on these matrices. Small 
errors induce a substantial downward bias of the probability of 
remaining poor, while comp arisons across states seem more robust, 
which is promising for impact analysis. 
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